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ticed in state and local elections,4' but this limitation makes the curtailment of
"legal" discrimination in federal elections none the less desirable.
CIVIL JURISDICTION TO REVIEW COURT-
MARTIAL PROCEEDINGS
The petitioner, a private in the United States Army, was tried and convicted
by an army general court-martial in Germany in April 1945 on charges of rape
and sodomy. The petitioner sought release from imprisonment by writ of
habeas corpus in a federal district court, claiming that the court-martial had
failed to acquire jurisdiction and that he had been denied due process of law.
The court, through examination of a transcript of the record of the trial, and
from oral testimony of an officer who had been connected with the proceedings,
found that in pre-trial examinations the accused, petitioner, was not present
at the interrogation of witnesses; that he was then confronted by witnesses
only during an informal "viewing" in which accused was lined up with other
soldiers and the witnesses were asked to identify the persons they thought had
committed the alleged attacks; that at no time during such examinations was
he informed of his right to, or given an opportunity to, cross-examine any of
the witnesses; that he was brought to trial two days after charges had been
served on him; that a medical officer who had never had any experience in de-
fending was appointed as his counsel and that he had only a short conversation
with this counsel before the trial; that he had expressed his desire to have as his
counsel a certain officer, known to have had experience in defending, and that
this officer was never obtained as counsel; and that witnesses requested by him
were not produced at the trial. The court held that by reason of failure to com-
ply with Article of War 70' with respect to pre-trial investigation, the court-
martial was without jurisdiction to try the petitioner, and granted a writ of
habeas corpus for his discharge from custody. Anthony v. Hunter.2
During periods of war, the prodigiously increased burden of administering
military law reveals inadequacies and inefficiencies which are not otherwise ap-
parent.3 The inevitable result of the necessity for speedy military justice ad-
ministered under the stress of wartime circumstances is the existence of shock-
ing miscarriages of justice and extreme severity of punishment. An equally in-
evitable aftermath of war is a deluge of litigation in the civil courts, in which
41 Arkansas has recognized this state of the law by separating the primaries for state and
federal officials. Ark. Acts 1945, c. 107, held constitutional in Adams v. Whitaker, r95 S.W.
2d 634 (Ark., 1946). But for a broader view see Professor Kallenbach's article, op. cit. supra
note 39, at 731 n. 48, where it is pointed out that constitutional support for the power of Con-
gress to nullify the poll tax in all elections could be held to stem from Article IV, Section 4 of
the Constitution, which guarantees a republican form of government to the states.
14' Stat. 802 (1920), IO U.S.C.A. § 1542 (1946).
2 71 F. Supp. 823 (Kan., 1947).
Rheinstein, Military Justice, in Puttkammer, War and the Law 155, 159 (i944).
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those convicted by military tribunals seek to gain their freedom or mitigation
of their punishments. The question as to the scope of review exercisable by the
courts over the proceedings of military tribunals then becomes one of first im-
portance.
The theory of a fundamental dichotomy between the systems of military and
civil justice has long been the basis of the reluctance of civil courts to question
the decisions of military tribunals.4 Thus, under the Constitution, courts-mar-
tial form no part of the judicial system of the United States.s It is now estab-
lished that it is improper to seek relief in the civil courts from decisions of mili-
tary tribunals by means of the writs of mandamus, 6 prohibition,7 and certiorari.8
However, courts-martial have been characterized as inferior courts of limited
and special jurisdiction, and, as such, their decisions are open to collateral at-
tack.9 Virtually the only means for such attack is the writ of habeas corpus. 0
In the instant case, the petitioner claimed his right to release by habeas cor-
pus on two grounds. He maintained first that the military court was without
jurisdiction to try him because the provisions of Article of War 70 which pro-
vide for thorough and impartial pre-trial investigation had not been complied
with." His second contention was based on this same assertion, along with ob-
jections to the failure of the reviewing authority to set aside the verdict for in-
sufficiency of evidence, the denial of witnesses and of opportunity to prepare for
tria'l, the denial of counsel of his own choosing, the designation of an incompe-
tent person as counsel, the alleged disqualification of certain members of the
court-martial, 2 and the failure to advise petitioner as to his rights. The petition-
4 See United States v. Clark, 31 Fed. 710, 713 (C.C. Mich., 1887); Smith v. Whitney, 116
U.S. 167, 178 (x886); Ex parte Henderson, ii Fed. Cas. io67, io6g, No. 6347 (C.C. Ky., 1878);
Lobb, Civil Authority versus Military, 3 Minn. L. Rev. XoS, i6 (1919).
' United States v. McDonald, 265 Fed. 754 (N.Y., 1920), appeal dismissed, 256 U.S. 705
(1920); Ex parte Dickey, 2o4 Fed. 322 (Me., 1913); In re Vidal, 179 U.S. 126 (igoo); United
States v. Maney, 6i Fed. 14o (C.C. Minn., z894); Arnold, Military Law, io Encyc. Soc. Sci.
453, 455 (1933).
6 United States v. Weeks, 259 U.S. 326 (1922).
7 Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564 (1885). But see Smith v. Whitney, 116 U.S. 167 (i886);
United States v. Maney, 61 Fed. 140 (C.C. Minn., x894).
' In re Vidal, 179 U.S. 126 (19oo).
9 Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. (U.S.) 193, 202 (1830).
xo Stein, judicial Review of Determinations of Federal Military Tribunals, ii Brooklyn L.
Rev. 3o , 6o (i94i).
x 41 Stat. 802 (1920), io U.S.C.A. § 1542 (1946). These provisions, so far as they are perti-
nent to this case, are as follows:
"No charge will be referred to a general court martial for trial until after a thorough and
impartial investigation thereof shall have been made ..... At such investigation full opportu-
nity shall be given to the accused to cross-examine witnesses against him if they are available
and to present anything he may desire in his own behalf either in defense or mitigation, and the
investigating officer shall examine available witnesses requested by the accused.
"In time of peace no person shall, against his objection, be brought to trial before a general
court-martial within a period of five days subsequent to the service of charges upon him."
1" The facts concerning this claim are not mentioned by the court. They involve substantial-
ly the contentions that the alleged "law" member of the court-martial was not a lawyer and
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er argued that these errors individually and collectively constituted a denial of
due process which entitled him to release by writ of habeas corpus.
The latter contention of the petitioner raises the issue of the denial of consti-
tutional rights. An early rule was that in habeas corpus proceedings the court
is limited solely to a consideration of the jurisdiction of the court below, and
that as to matters other than this the proceedings and findings of that court are
unassailable. Z3 In the early history of the United States, one of the most impor-
tant uses of habeas corpus in the federal courts was to secure the release of
federal officers who had been imprisoned through proceedings in state courts. 4
Dissatisfaction with early limitations upon the federal courts in such cases
prompted a series of extensions by Congress of the scope of inquiry permissible,s
culminating with the acts of 1867 by which the scope of inquiry was extended to
include a consideration of whether the prisoner "is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or of a law or treaty of the United States."' 6 Since the introduction
of this provision, and especially in the last two decades, there has been an in-
creasing readiness on the part of the federal courts and the Supreme Court to
grant relief to persons convicted in state courts where it appears that they were
denied due process of law. 7 Unfortunately, in some of these cases the courts
have not recognized the statutory provisions as actual extensions of the scope
of inquiry beyond that allowed under the old rule. In attempting to grant relief
and yet maintain the old rule, they proceeded upon the theory that where a
trial is conducted in such an unfair and unwarranted manner that "the whole
proceeding is a mask"' 8 and due process is denied, the trial court has abused its
power and loses jurisdiction to pronounce the sentence. 9 The result has been an
was not from the Judge Advocate General's Department. Article of War 8,41 Stat. 788 (1920),
io U.S.C.A. § 1479 (1928) requires that the law member be from the Judge Advocate Gen-
eral's Department whenever possible.
'3 Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. (U.S.) 193 (i83o); Iri re Metzger, 5 How. (U.S.) 176 (1847);
Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879); In re Savin, 31 U.S. 267 (i888); Glasgow v. Moyer,
225 U.S. 420 (i911); Henry v. Henkel, 235 U.S. 219 (1914); Knewel v. Egan, 268 U.S. 442
(1924).
X4 In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 70-73 (x889). 's Ibid.
16 x4 Stat. 385, c. 28 (1867), 28 U.S.C.A. § 453 (i928). It is quite probable that even without
the statute the courts would have made this extension under the Fourteenth Amendment.
"7 Pyle v. Kansas, 327 U.S. 213 (942); Waley v. Johnston, 326 U.S. ioi (1942); Walker
v. Johnston, 3X2 U.S. 275 (i4i); Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329 (2942); Bowen v. John-
ston, 3o6 U.S. 19 (i939); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); Mooney v. Holohan,
294 U.S. 103 (i935); Moore v. Dempsey, 262 U.S. 86 (2923). The two most recent Supreme
Court decisions on this point, Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173 (I947), and Craig v. Harney, 67
S. Ct. 1249 (2947), are also cited by the Court in support of the position that in the inquiry
into whether or not due process has been denied, the court may admit evidence "dehors the
record."
Is Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 91 (1923).
9 In Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (2938), where the petitioner had been tried and con-
victed in a state court without assistance of counsel, the Supreme Court said, "If the accused,
however, is not represented by counsel and has not competently and intelligently waived his
constitutional right, the Sixth Amendment stands as a jurisdictional bar to a valid conviction.
... ." Ibid., at 468.
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unwarranted confusion in the application of the term "jurisdiction."
Despite this extension with respect to review of state court decisions, the
courts until very recently have persisted in applying the old rule where the de-
cision under attack is that of a military court. 0 This may undoubtedly be ac-
counted for by the courts' reluctance to interfere with military affairs, along
with their recognition that the Congressional action in extending the scope of
habeas corpus was aimed primarily at providing a broader ground for attack on
the decisions of state courts. In 1943, however, the Circuit Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit broke away from the strict rule and held that a petitioner is
entitled to release on habeas corpus petition if it appears that he was denied due
process in a court-martial proceeding." A year later, the Circuit Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit in a lengthy dictum recognized that procedural due
process is not the same for members of the armed forces as it is for other persons,
and that for them it is the application of the procedure of military law. The
court asserted, nevertheless, that ". . . . the due process clause guarantees to
them that this military procedure will be applied to them in a fundamentally
fair way.' 2 This dictum was relied on in the controversial case of Hicks v.
Hiatt'4 where relief was granted to a petitioner on the grounds that numerous
errors in a court-martial proceeding, with respect primarily to introduction and
exclusion of evidence, collectively resulted in a "fundamentally unfair" applica-
tion of military procedure, and thus was a denial of due process. In the Hicks
case, the errors considered sufficient to warrant relief were less important than
20See McClaughry v. Deming, 186 U.S. 49 (19ox); Ex parte Reed, 1oo U.S. 13 (1879);
Dynes v. Hoover, 2o How. (U.S.) 65 (1857); Carter v. McClaughry, io5 Fed. 614 (C.C. Kan.,
9oi), aff'd 183 U.S. 365 (19o2); Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564 (1885); Carter v. Woodring,
92 F. 2d 544 (App. D.C., 1937), cert. den. 302 U.S. 752 (1937); Rose v. Roberts, g Fed. 948
(C.C.A. 2d, i9oo); Ex parte Henderson, ii Fed. Cas. 1o67, No. 6347 (C.C. Ky., 1878). Even
in these cases, however, there are to be found some extensions of the common law rule, one of
the most frequent being the inclusion in the inquiry of a consideration of whether or not the
sentence pronounced conformed with the law. There are also found dicta to the effect that re-
lief may be granted on habeas corpus where it appears that not all of the statutory regulations
governing the proceedings of the court-martial had been compiled with. Dynes v. Hoover,
supra; Runle v. United States, 122 U.S. 543, 556 (1887). If such dicta were to be taken at
face value, it would constitute a tremendous extension of the scope of habeas corpus. That it
has not been so taken by the courts is apparent from the notable absence of cases granting
relief on this ground.
2 Schita v. King, 133 F. 2d 283 (C.C.A. 8th, 1943). Upon a rehearing in the district court,
the petitioner failed to prove the alleged irregularities in the court-martial proceedings and the
writ was dismissed. Schita v. Cox, 139 F. 2d 971 (C.C.A. 8th, i944).
United States v. Hiatt, 141 F. 2d 664 (C.C.A. 3d, i944). The distinction between pro-
cedural due process for members of the armed forces and procedural due process for other per-
sons was made by the Supreme Court in Reaves v. Ainsworth, 219 U.S. 296, 304 (gxo).
23 United States v. Hiatt, 41 F. 2d 664, 666 (C.C.A. 3 d, x944).
24 64 F. Supp. 238 (Pa., 1946). On January 24, 1946, subsequent to the rendering of the
opinion, the court issued an order dismissing the proceedings in habeas corpus as moot. Ibid.,
at 25o. This case is noted in 13 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 494 (1946); 4 111. L. Rev. 26o (1946); 24
Tex. L. Rev. 503 (1946); 37 J. Crim. L. 304 (1946).
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the obvious travesties of justice which have impelled the Supreme Court to
grant similar relief, and the position which would be taken by the Supreme
Court on a decision such as that in the Hicks case is far from certain.25 The facts
in the instant case present a much stronger argument that due process was
denied. Nevertheless, in view of the previously mentioned distinction between
military and civil due process, it is questionable whether even these errors would
be considered by the Supreme Court as constituting a denial of due process war-
ranting relief. It was undoubtedly a realization of the dubious character of the
Hicks decision which motivated the present court to sidestep the due process
question and base its decision upon the lack of jurisdiction of the court-martial
because of its obvious failure to comply with Article of War 70.
In basing its decision on this jurisdictional point, the court was on firmer
ground. Prior to 1920 there was little statutory regulation of trial procedure for
courts-martial and, consequently, the convening officers were given considerable
license in such matters. The general dissatisfaction with the manner in which the
system of military justice functioned during the first World War prompted the
extensive revision of the Articles of War in I92o,26 which included the introduc-
tion of procedural regulations such as Article 70. Though the requirements of
this Article have been criticized as unwarrantably complex and cumbersome,27
Congress deemed them necessary as part of an important general reform aimed
at the safeguarding of the rights of the accused. In view of their introduction
under these circumstances, the license assumed by convening officers in cases
such as the present is indefensible. In 1924 the Judge Advocate General of the
Army handed down an opinion that:
The provisions of Article of War 70 with reference to investigating charges are
mandatory and there must be a substantial compliance therewith before charges can
be legally referred for trial. A court-martial is without jurisdiction to try an accused
upon charges referred to it for trial without having first been investigated in sub-
25 The main contentions of the petitioner in the Hicks case were that the investigating
officer had failed to investigate contentions of the accused which were relative to the charges,
that irrelevant and hearsay evidence was introduced against the accused, that evidence favor-
able to the accused was excluded, that accused was found guilty where there was no proof of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the reviewing authority abused its power by failing
to order a new trial. The Supreme Court and the federal courts have adhered strictly to the
rule that in habeas corpus proceedings errors of an evidentiary nature will not be reviewed, in-
asmuch as to do so would be to perform the function of an appellate court. In re Yamashita,
327 U.S. x (1946); Miller v. Hiatt, 41 F. 2d 690 (C.C.A. 3d, i944); McMullen v. Squier, 144
F. 2d 703 (C.C.A. 9th, 1944); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942); Carpenter v. Hudspeth, 112
F. 2d 126 (C.C.A. xoth, 194o); Harlan v. McGourin, 218 U.S. 442 (i91o). It does not seem
likely that the Supreme Court would abandon this rule and inquire into questions such as
weight of evidence in a habeas corpus proceeding even where denial of due process is alleged.
26 The New Articles of War, 21 Col. L. Rev. 477 (1921); Bauer, The Court-Martial Contro-
versy and the New Articles of War, 6 Mass. L.Q. 6i (1921); Ansell, Military Justice, 5 Corn.
L.Q. i (1919); Bogert, Courts-Martial: Criticisms and Proposed Reforms, 5 Corn. L.Q. x8
(1919).
27The New Articles of War, 21 Col. L. Rev. 477, 480 (1921).
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stantial compliance with the provisions of Article of War 70 and, in such a case, the
court-martial proceedings are void ab initio.21
As was pointed out by the respondent, however, this opinion was expressly
overruled in an opinion of the Board of Review of the Army in 1943, in which it
was declared that the provisions of the Article were purely directory, and that
failure to comply with them had no effect whatever on the validity of the pro-
ceedings unless it could be shown that the failure "injuriously affected sub-
stantial rights" of the accused.29
The court in the instant case, observing that "little light is shed upon the
problem by the conflicting administrative rulings,"30 determined that "full ex-
ploration of the question seems to be dictated."3' It found that the only case
decided by an appellate court bearing on the point was that of Reilly v. Pescor,32
in which it was held that the provisions of Article of War 70 are mandatory and
that substantial compliance with them is a jurisdictional requirement. It is in-
teresting to note that the decision in that case was based almost entirely on the
1924 opinion of the Judge Advocate General. Of course, the opinions of the
Judge Advocate General and the Board of Review have no binding effect upon
the civil courts in the interpretation of the Articles, but it does seem incongruous
to cite one of these opinions in support of a position when the opinion has since
been expressly overruled. Having discussed the opinion in the Reilly case, the
court went on to consider the Article itself and the relevant sections of the
Army Manual for Courts-Martial, and found that "both clearly indicate that
the impartial investigation contemplated should be conducted upon the charges
and specifications as formally prepared rather than to determine whether
charges will be made." 33 The court concluded that had the sequence specified
in the provisions been the only matter deviated from, such error might be over-
looked, but that in view of the failure to comply with other requirements, such
as that declaring the accused's right to cross-examine witnesses, the court was
bound to act. It said:
28 Digest of Ops., Judge Adv. Gen., 1912-40, § 428 (1), at 292 (1924).
29 C.M. 229477, Floyd, 17 B.R. x49 (1943). Not mentioned by the court are a number of
subsequent holdings of the Board of Review which have adopted the position set forth in this
opinion: C.M. 235407, Claybourn, 22 B.R. 34 (1943); C.M. 237032, Nelson, 23 B.R. 34 (1943);
C.M. 2513', Watts, 33 B.R. 195 (1944); C.M. 257806, Engels, 37 B.R. 231 (1944); C.M.
273791, Gould, 45 B.R. 29 (1945); C.M. (ETO) 17056, Boger, 3z B.R. (ETO) 341 (1945); C.M.
(ETO) 4570, Hawkins, 13 B.R. (ETO) 57 (1945). The test of "injuriously affecting substantial
rights," which is applied by the Board of Review in all of these cases, is taken from Article of
War 37,41 Stat. 794 (1920), io U.S.C.A. § 1508 (1946), which provides: "The proceedings of a
court-martial shall not be held invalid, nor the findings of sentence disapproved, in any case on
the ground of improper admission or rejection of evidence or for any error as to any matter of
pleading or procedure unless in the opinion of the reviewing or confirming authority, after an
examination of the entire proceedings, it shall appear that the error complained of has in-
juriously affected the substantial rights of an accused .......
3o Anthony v. Hunter, 71 F. Supp. 823, 830 (Kan., 1947).
,3 Ibid.
32 x56 F. 2d 632 (C.C.A. 8th, 1946), cert. den. 67 S. Ct. 353 (1946).
33 Anthony v. Hunter, 71 F. Supp. 823, 831 (Kan., 1947).
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.... the defects pointed out above are, in the studied judgment of this court, too
serious to be ignored. The Congress, in its wisdom, has prescribed the procedure to be
followed. It has stated categorically what must be done. Whether failure to do the
things required be construed as a defect precluding the acquiring of jurisdiction or
whether the failure be held to deprive the accused of the due process contemplated by
the organic law, the result is the same. Relief should be granted ..... 34
Essentially, the court has adopted the "substantial compliance" test as it
was set out in the opinion of the Judge Advocate General and the Reilly case.
By holding substantial compliance with the provisions of the Article to be man-
datory, failure of the court-martial to comply becomes per se an error "injurious-
ly affecting substantial rights" of the accused. The court's position seems to be
fundamentally sound. As has been noted, the provisions involved here were
adopted as part of a general reform of the Articles of War, the chief purpose of.
which was to correct conditions which had resulted in an undesirable, inefficient,
and in many cases unjust administration of military justice and had led to
violent public criticism of the court-martial system. In the light of these con-
siderations, it does not seem logical to assume that Congress adopted these pro-
visions with the intention that they should merely provide a suggested method
of procedure, the failure to comply with which would in no way affect the
validity of subsequent proceedings. It would rather seem that Congress felt that
the imposition of a regulated procedure was one of the means by which the
rights of the accused could be better protected. Nor does the interpretation of
the provisions as mandatory open the floodgates for the release of unquestion-
ably guilty persons through the mere showing that insignificant procedural re-
quirements were not fulfilled. The notion of "substantial compliance" is flexible,
and the courts will be rightly hesitant to hold that insignificant defects preclude
substantial compliance3s
The court's evasion of the due process question was wise from a tactical point
of view. It appears from the language of the opinion, however, that, had the
court not been able to grant relief on any other ground, it might well have
adopted the position taken in Hicks v. Hiatt, and granted relief on the ground
of denial of due process.36 Such action would certainly be justifiable, for where
a proceeding is as patently unfair as that of the court-martial in the instant
case, the interest in protecting the fundamental rights of the accused outweighs
34 Ibid.
3s In Ex parte Smith, 72 F. Supp. 935 (Pa., 1947), the court denied relief on allegation of
petitioner that the originator of the charges on which the accused had been tried and convicted
before a court-martial had also conducted the pre-trial examination and as such was "ineligible
to be the impartial investigator under the 7oth Article of War." The court held that this was
not a sufficient showing to warrant relief where it appeared affirmatively that in all respects
other than this the Article of War was fully complied with and the examination was conducted
in a fair and impartial manner.
36 Toward the end of the opinion the court states that the errors".... individually and
collectively might have justified this court in plagiarizing some of the language used by Judge
Biggs .... in Hicks v. Hiatt ..... " Anthony v. Hunter, 71 F. Supp. 823, 831 (Kan., 1947).
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any policy notion as to the extent to which the civil courts should interfere
with the military.
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF ILLINOIS DIVORCE ACT
The rising tide of family dissolution has at last attracted the attention of the
Illinois legislature. In the 1947 session, several pieces of new "husband and
wife" legislation were placed on the statute books., Unfortunately, these acts
are at best only a surface medication for a serious and many-faceted social prob-
lem. Even more unfortunately, the little assistance they promised to courts now
struggling with crowded dockets and inadequate administrative facilities has
been drastically curtailed by the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court in Hunt
v. Cook County2 holding that the Domestic Relations Act,3 the most important
of the statutes, is unconstitutional.
The Domestic Relations Act would set up, "in judicial circuits of 500,000 or
more," a Divorce Division with masters in chancery to hear complaints for
divorce, annulment, separate maintenance, petitions regarding custody of chil-
dren, alimony, and child support. The principal purpose of the Act is to provide
reconciliation machinery. For example, one provision allows the court to im-
pound the records for at least thirty days after filing of the complaint in any
action in which the rights of minor children are involved,4 so as to prevent
undesirable publicity during the time in which reconciliation will be attempted
and to protect minor children from embarrassment. Other provisions require
the payment of alimony and support directly to the Divorce Division (unless
the court otherwise'directs),s and allow the court to require reports on the wel-
fare of the children from any person or agency to whom custody is awarded.6
The direct supervision given to the court over the payment of alimony and
support is one of the most important features of the act. Judge Robson of the
Superior Court of Cook County, in a comprehensive analysis of Cook County's
problem with the children of divorced parents, has shown that the inadequacy
of the financial protection they receive is increased by the fact that many sup-
port orders are in arrears because the mother has no funds with which to engage
an attorney, and the orders are either abandoned or allowed to accumulate until
1 l. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1947) c. 68, § 34 (limiting recovery in alienation of affections
actions to actual damages and expressly barring recovery of punitive, exemplary, vindictive, or
aggravated damages); ibid., c. 68, § 41 (substantially identical statute on criminal conversa-
tion actions); ibid., c. 4o , § 13 (extending in injunction powers of court in divorce actions to
restrain third party's interference with possibility of reconciliation or other amicable adjust-
ment of the suit); ibid., c. 40, § 19 (allowing court to modify permanent alimony decree in
proceeding separate and subsequent to divorce action upon obtaining jurisdiction of the person
of defendant unless alimony was expressly waived or denied, or another settlement made);
ibid., c. 37, § ios (new divorce statute).
398 Ill. 412, 76 N.E. 2d 48 (1947).
3 Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1947) c. 37, § 1o.
4 Ibid., at § 1o5.o. 5 Ibid., at § IO5.I5. 6Ibid., at § 1o5.16.
